# Feedback and Counterproposal on L2Beat's Stage 1 Requirements Proposed Update

**URL:** <https://community.starknet.io/t/feedback-and-counterproposal-on-l2beats-stage-1-requirements-proposed-update/116094>\
**Category:** 📜 Development Proposals\
**Tags:** consensus, decentralization\
**Created:** [December 22, 2025, 3:45pm UTC](https://community.starknet.io/t/feedback-and-counterproposal-on-l2beats-stage-1-requirements-proposed-update/116094 "2025-12-22T15:45:05Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![eitanm-starkware](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/a8b319/32.png) [@eitanm-starkware](https://community.starknet.io/u/eitanm-starkware)\
**Post date:** [December 22, 2025, 3:45pm UTC](https://community.starknet.io/t/feedback-and-counterproposal-on-l2beats-stage-1-requirements-proposed-update/116094/1 "2025-12-22T15:45:05Z")

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**Abstract**

The [proposed](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/stage-1-requirements-update-security-council-walkaway-test/412) “Security Council permanently inactive” assumption is a **Stage 2 autonomy bar** , not a Stage 1 refinement. Keep **Stage 1** stable; designate **Stage 2** as the home for censorship-resistance mechanisms in practice — specifically, **forced transactions** and **sequencing decentralization** — and move the current “fully code-controlled end-state” requirements into **Stage 3**.

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We support strengthening censorship-resistance and liveness guarantees over time, and we appreciate the effort to clarify how these properties should be measured. That said, we think the proposed new requirement — “the previous requirement must hold even if the Security Council is permanently inactive” — is a **Stage 2 autonomy requirement** rather than a Stage 1 refinement.

It changes the trust model from “recoverable assuming an honest SC majority” to “fully self-sufficient even if governance disappears.”

In parallel, we believe the dominant trust assumption in the medium term is not “SC inactivity,” but **who can propose blocks and include transactions** , and whether users have a **mechanical enforcement path** if they are censored.

For that reason, we suggest Stage 2 should explicitly incorporate two concrete, measurable pillars that directly address censorship risk in normal operations:

- **Forced transactions + liveness fallback** (with a clear, bounded maximum delay for enforcement), and
- **Sequencing decentralization** (e.g., multi-operator block proposal with defined quorum/threshold rules and a credible path toward permissionless participation).

Therefore, our counter-proposal is:

1. **Keep Stage 1 semantics stable** (do not add the “SC permanently inactive” assumption to Stage 1).
2. Keep protection from the “inactive security council” requirement in **Stage 2** , and define Stage 2 around the ability of users to permissionlessly affect sequencing through **forced transactions** and **sequencing decentralization** , as the practical mechanisms that reduce censorship power.  
One of the reasons for decentralized sequencing: Forced transactions are very time-insensitive and are inapplicable to many DeFi use-cases, where liquidations can be completed in seconds. Decentralized sequencing is done immediately and is much more applicable when real funds are involved.
3. To preserve a clear progression, move the current Stage 2 “fully code-controlled end-state” requirements (e.g., permissionless proof/challenge systems, long upgrade exit windows, and SC restricted strictly to adjudicable on-chain bug conditions) into a **Stage 3** tier. Stage 3 can then be defined as “protection from a malicious security council”, in line with the previous stages, where assumptions around the security council are gradually reduced.

Finally, as noted in the proposal, adopting “SC permanently inactive” as a Stage 1 requirement would largely collapse the **Stage 1 ↔ Stage 2** distinction into “upgradability-only”, while disregarding the other censorship-resistance mechanisms between Stages. We view preserving a meaningful ladder as important: keep Stage 1 stable, use Stage 2 to measure concrete censorship-resistance mechanisms — **such as forced transactions and sequencing decentralization** — and reduce Stage 3 to **upgradability** as L2Beat proposed.