Great plan for decentralization! Congrats to the team!
I have a question regarding “There is no partial unstaking”:
If there are 2 delegators on 1 node, can 1 delegator undelegate independently from another? Will this delegator have to undelegate 100% of the delegation or does partial unstaking relates only to the self-stake?
As a potential staking operator, who is very confused about this proposed design –
Let’s assume that 50% of the STRK circulating supply is staked, which would be e.g. $500 million. Under the current discussions, there is a self-staking requirement for 20% of this amount for node operators/stakers, which would amount to $100 million of STRK.
As liquid staking / staking providers, we would be required to buy and lock (essentially forever) $100 million of STRK as no partial unstaking of that portion is allowed?
Can you please explain where liquid staking / staking protocols will be able to get tens of millions of dollars of STRK from:
Furthermore, there is no penalty for stakers at the moment. What is the rationale for requiring them to lock this much capital now?
Thanks @Anton_Gaev_p2p.org !
About the first question: yes, each delegator can undelegate his funds and is not dependent in other delegators.
About the second question, we are working on a flow for partial undelegate (i.e. partial unstaking only for delegators.) I’ll update the post when I’ll have certainty that it will be on the first version launch.
Hi @david , thanks for raising these issues with the proposal. Similar problems surfaced during talks we are having with LST protocols and Staking infra providers.
We are considering adjustments that would solve or mitigate the issues you brought up. I will update you soon!
Hello I want to ask something about this, so for example I stake 10K STRK I get same reward as 1000 STRK or something? what’s the benefit of staking with high amount then?
Hi @syaerulid , if you Stake different amounts, you will earn different amounts. The staking rewards are proportional the amount you staked, for example as a delegator:
{stake_delegated} * R * {rewards_constant} * {time_interval}
See the section Staking rewards more details.
When Stwo Prover is released, users with consumer hardware might be able to participate in staking. If this happens, it would be great if stakers who don’t have 100% availability aren’t penalized. Solo stakers face many potential issues, such as hardware failures and ISP problems. Despite this, users will still be motivated to do their job, as they won’t receive any rewards otherwise.
Does the proposal base staking rewards solely on minting new STRK without any fee revenue sharing? No burning mechanism is mentioned either. So we are just adding another supply stream in this early phase.
On top of the gradual release of the total supply of 10 billion STRK, this proposal doesn’t seem to provide any strong incentive for buying STRK.
Is the plan to keep STRK as “governance” only token for retail part of users? While I recognize the amazing work of starkware team and wish you good luck forward, staking without any fee revenue sharing doesn’t seem bullish for STRK. I believe that we are past 2017 and 2021 era when market euphoria fogged the economic model of a token, therefore a market will not react well to token that doesn’t provide value in long term.
I’m not sure I understand your point. Granted Starknet transitions to EIP-1559 style fee market, are you saying that fees should be burnt? I tend to agree if validators receive block rewards anyway.
STRK token is already being used as a gas token on Starknet today, my understanding is that it is the main use case for STRK long term. Secondly is governance.
This update includes an amendment to the SNIP regarding the Stake Delegation threshold mechanism and a proposal for the minimum Stake.
A new commit with the updated SNIP was submitted to the SNIP repo.
We have decided to amend our proposal to exclude the Stake Delegation Threshold (DT) mechanism. After releasing our initial proposal, we received numerous comments and feedback from the community. While there were many positive responses, the DT mechanism raised concerns among developers and users. Their constructive and rational feedback prompted us to engage in internal discussions and conduct further research.
We concluded that the DT mechanism is redundant and may impede the growth of the staking community. By eliminating the DT, we aim to:
We suggest the minimum stake to be 20K STRK, which is within the range of the original proposal. This number was derived to balance several considerations, including the security of the decentralized protocol, the desired number of Stakers to ensure broad participation, the estimated hardware costs for Stakers, and insights gained from comparisons with other blockchains, learning from their experiences and avoiding their mistakes.
The suggested value is our proposed starting point for this protocol version. As part of the rationale behind this version, it is subject to change and may be adjusted to better suit the protocol’s needs, according to the relevant governance procedure.
Just curious if eip1559 burning will be introduced and how the overall inflation rate will be expected?
Our current plan is to slash only for provable ofences, for example signing contradicting blocks. Inactivity currently is planned to be slahsable.
Thank you, @dzupp, for your detailed comment.
The complete vision for STRK tokenomics is still under formulation. It will include block rewards, tips, and a combination of burned and allocated fees. We are actively researching this area and hope to share more information soon.
In the meantime, you can explore some of the ongoing research by Professor Noam Nisan here: Simple Tokenomics for a Proof-of-Stake Utility Token.
Hey @eiki, I tend to agree, I wouldn’t necessarily rank the utilities of STRK, just would mention that Staking, i.e. securing the network, using it for fees and governance are all part of the STRK token vision.
Hey, similar answer to what I wrote here: SNIP 18: Staking’s First Stage on Starknet - #34 by NatanSW
Please check out the research paper by Noam Nisan linked in the comment above.
This update includes two added functionalities to the Staking proposal: partial undelegate and functionality and Staker’s ability to change it’s commission policy.
A new commit with the updated SNIP was submitted to the SNIP repo.
We are incorporating a partial undelegation functionality into our proposal. This will allow any delegator to invoke the exit_delegation_pool_intent function with an amount that is either equal to or less than their total delegation. When this function is called, an event will be emitted containing the delegator’s address, the specified amount, and the time when the withdrawal will be allowed, considering the security lockup period of 21 days.
Once the security lockup period has passed, the delegator can withdraw their stake by invoking the exit_delegation_pool_action function.
If an undelegation intent is initiated but the corresponding undelegation action is not completed, any new undelegation intent will override the previous request, and the 21-day lockup period will reset from the time of the last call.
When a Staker joins the protocol, they can choose whether to be open to Delegation and set their rewards sharing parameter (R), i.e. their commission policy. A Staker can lower their commission rate but cannot increase it. This restriction is in place to prevent Stakers from attracting a large number of delegators with low commissions and then suddenly raising the rates.
In future versions, we may explore more sophisticated commission policies, such as time locks for changes, maximum allowable changes per time interval, and additional features.
Really excited for the first stage of staking here!
A few questions:
Thanks for this great post and amazing job behind.
Suppose you have two delegated stakers D1 and D2 who delegate to staker S. If S exists, are D1 and D2 forced to exit as well, and don’t have access to their funds for 21 days?
Are you considering liquid staked tokens?